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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
fear of the public humiliation which might result from the
child's later exercising the strengthened rights of inheritance




According to Louisiana civilian classification, the category
of public things includes property of the public domain, prop-
erty of the private domain, and things subject to public use,
whether they belong to a public body or to a private person.1
In the 1969-1970 term, Louisiana courts decided a number of
interesting cases dealing with property of the public domain,
such as navigable waterbottoms, and things subject to public
use, such as roads and streets, parks, cemeteries, and banks of
navigable rivers.
Navigable Waterbottoms
According to well-settled principles of Louisiana civil law,
navigable waterbottoms are things of the public domain which,
by definition, are insusceptible of private ownership.2 An in-
volved course of legislative action, however, and judicial inter-
pretation of obscure texts, have resulted in the recognition of
private ownership in beds of certain navigable waters.
Originally, the prohibition against alienation by the state
of the navigable waters was based upon the interpretation placed
by the courts on article 453 of the Civil Code. The first direct
prohibition occurred in 1886 when Act 1063 of that year declared
that the state owned all waters adjoining the Gulf and at the
same time provided that the public ownership of these waters
should be continued and maintained. Subsequently, the prohi-
bition was fortified by the judicial doctrine of "inherent sover-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CVIL LAW PROPERTY § 30 (1966).
2. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 453, 482; Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173
So. 315 (1936); State ex rel. Saint v. Timothy, 166 La. 738, 117 So. 812 (1928);
State ex rel. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Capdeville, 146 La. 94, 83 So. 421 (1919); Lou-
isiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Comm'n, 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910); Milne
v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324 (1838). But cf. California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 734,
74 So.2d 1, 11 (1954), declaring that the bottoms of navigable lakes and bays
"are by their nature susceptible or capable of private ownership."
3. See La. Acts 1886, No. 106, now A. R.S. 49:3 (1950). See also La. Acts
1892, No. 110; La. Acts 1896, No. 121; La. Acts 1902, No. 153; La. Acts 1904,
No. 52; La. Acts 1924, No. 139; La. Acts 1932, No. 67; La. Acts 1938, No. 55.
[Vol. 31
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 197
eignty," and, finally, by the adoption of a constitutional pro-
vision in 1921 which prohibits the alienation of "the fee of the
bed of any navigable stream, lake or other body of water, except
for purposes of reclamation. '4
In the meanwhile, Act 247 of 1855 had authorized the sale
by the state of shallow non-navigable lakes and swamplands
recently acquired under grant from the United States, and Act
124 of 1862 had assimilated dried out navigable lakes to swamp-
lands and had removed the prohibition against the alienation of
such lands. On the basis of these and subsequent similar statutes,
patents were issued by the state purporting to convey to private
interests large areas containing both navigable and non-navigable
waters. No special mention was made reserving title to navigable
waters in the state, and several years thereafter the question
arose as to whether or not such patents could convey title to the
bottoms of navigable waters. In order to promote security of
title, the Louisiana Legislature passed Act 62 of 1912,5 a repose
statute, which provided that all suits to annul or vacate patents
issued by the state or by its political subdivisions must be
brought within six years of the issuance of the patent, or within
six years of the passage of the act. On the basis of this statute,
it has been held that conveyances which included beds of
navigable waters without reserving title to them in the state
are valid and no longer assailable0 It is in this way that Lou-
isiana arrived at private ownership of the bottoms of navigable
waters.
4. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
5. See La. Acts 1912, No. 62, now I.. R.S. 9:5681 (1950). Since it is clear
that the Louisiana legislature could, in the absence of constitutional pro-
hibition, authorize the sale of navigable waters, it is merely a problem of
interpretation whether the Act of 1912 intended to cure patents conveying
only non-navigable waters or both navigable and non-navigable waters. The
majority view in California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 739, 74 So.2d 1, 12 (1954),
was that "the Legislature intended that the Act was to be all inclusive, in
conformity with the language used therein." A vigorous dissent indicated,
however, that "a reasonable construction of the statute would be that it only
applies to property susceptible of ownership .... " Id. at 750-51, 74 So.2d at 17.
6. See California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954); Humble Oil
& Ref. Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 223 La. 47, 64 So.2d 839 (1953); O'Brien v.
State Mineral Bd., 209 La. 266, 24 So.2d 470 (1945); Realty Operators, Inc. v.
State Mineral Bd., 202 La. 398, 12 So.2d 198 (1942); State v. Sweet Lake Land
& Oil Co., 164 La. 240, 113 So. 833 (1927). The Louisiana legislature sought to
overrule legislatively this line of cases by La. Acts 1954, No. 727, now L.
R.S. 9:1107-1109 (1965), which declares that La. Acts 1912, No. 62 did not in-
tend to cure patents to beds of navigable waters and that all patents "here-
tofore or hereafter" issued, conveying beds of navigable waters are null and
void. Insofar as La. Acts 1954, No. 727 purports to apply retroactively, it may
be regarded as unconstitutional. Cf. State v. Cenac, 241 La. 1055, 182 So.2d
928 (1961).
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In the 1969-1970 term, the applicability of the 1912 repose
statute to pre-1921 patents was considered in at least three cases.
In Sinclair Oil and Gas Co. v. Delacroix Corp.,7 a concursus
proceeding for the distribution of oil and gas royalties, private
persons claimed the ownership of certain navigable waterbot-
toms by virtue of a 1902 patent. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeal set aside a summary judgment, rendered by the lower
court in favor of claimants, on the ground that the case involved
a genuine dispute as to facts, namely, allegations by the state
that the patents in question had been obtained fraudulently. In
Carter v. Moore,8 a mandamus proceeding to compel state of-
ficials to void a corrective patent which had allegedly divested
plaintiffs of their interests in navigable waterbottoms, the state
urged the court to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the 1912
repose statute and to reconsider the validity of California Co.
v. Price0 as a precedent. Plaintiffs claimed the ownership of a
part of the bed of Grand Lake by virtue of an original patent
issued in 1881. In 1962, however, the state land office had issued
a corrective patent limiting plaintiffs' ownership to lands other
than waterbottoms that were navigable in 1812. The land office
justified its action as a correction of a clerical error. The First
Circuit Court of Appeal held that the 1912 repose statute, as
interpreted in the Price decision, precluded correction of the
original patent. Judge Blanche dissented, mainly on the ground
that the Price decision has been legislatively overruled.10 The
supreme court has granted certiorari, and, for this reason, com-
ments are withheld until final disposition of the case.
In Stevens v. State Mineral Board" plaintiffs brought action
against the state mineral board to remove "clouds"'12 from their
title to certain waterbottoms on the east coast of Louisiana.
The clouds consisted of recorded mineral leases granted by the
state to private interests. Defendants moved for a summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the state owned the property in ques-
tion by virtue of an adjudication for nonpayment of taxes and
that four links in plaintiffs' title were fatally defective. Plain-
7. 235 So.2d 191 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
8. 234 So.2d (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 256 La. 613, 237 So.2d
396 (1970).
9. 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).
10. Of. note 6 supra.
11. 221 So.2d 645 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), reversed, 255 La. 857, 233 So.2d
542 (1970).
12. The action to remove a cloud from title is a non-statutory "fringe" or
"quasi-real" action for the protection of ownership. See LA. CODE CIV. P. tit.
II, Introduction; A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 141 (1966).
[Vol. 31
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 199
tiffs invoked the repose statute of 1912. The Court of Appeal
for the Fourth Circuit considered only the question of the validity
of plaintiffs' title and granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants. The Supreme Court of Louisiana set the sum-
mary judgment aside on the ground that the case involved a
genuine dispute as to facts and remanded it to the district court.
Justices Sanders and Hamlin dissented. The involved discussion
of questions of law by the court of appeal and by Justice Hamlin
in his vigorous dissent will not be considered at this point, be-
cause, presumably, the same questions will arise in the new pro-
ceedings. It suffices to state that the decision of the court of ap-
peal represents, in effect, a valiant effort to limit the applicabil-
ity of the 1912 repose statute to pre-1886 patents, namely, to
patents issued before the enactment of the first oyster statute.
The supreme court should, perhaps, re-examine this approach
with the view to adopting a broadly acceptable interpretation
of the 1912 statute.
Highways, Roads, and Streets
Highways, roads, and streets may be either private things
or public things in Louisiana. They may be public things either
in the sense that their ownership "is vested in a whole nation,"13
or merely in the sense that they are subject to public use,
whether they are owned by the state, its political subdivisions,
or by private persons.1
4
In Foshee v. Longino'5 the Third Circuit Court of Appeal
found that a road had become public by application of LA. R.S.
48:491, which provides that an interest in the public use of a
road or street may be established through the maintenance by a
parish or municipality of a road or street for a period of three
years. The court indicated that public authorities need not spend
large sums of money and that maintenance of the road two or
three times a year would suffice. In St. Martin Parish Police
Jury v. Michel" a public road established under the same pro-
vision was formally abandoned by resolution of the police jury,
but this resolution was rescinded a few days later. When private
owners of the roadbed attempted to block access to it by the
erection of fences, the police jury brought an action for injunc-
13. LA. Cv. CoDu art. 453.
14. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CvI LAW PROPERTY §§ 30, 33 (1966).
15. 236 So.2d 870 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
16. 229 So.2d 463 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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tion. The court held that the formal resolution of the police jury
had freed the property of the servitude of public use and that
the servitude could not be re-established by the rescission of the
resolution; hence, an injunction would not lie. According to the
court, the rescission of the formal resolution would have divested
the owners of the roadbed of their property rights in violation
of article 4, section 15, of the Louisiana Constitution. In the con-
text of public law, the result appears to be plausible. In Lichten-
tag v. City of New Orleans7 plaintiff brought suit against the
city claiming compensation for a strip of land allegedly appro-
priated by the city for the construction of a sidewalk and for
damages to his remaining property. The court set aside a sum-
mary judgment in favor of the city on the ground that the case
involved a genuine dispute as to the fact of appropriation and
the amount of damages. In the course of its opinion, the court
indicated that if the property had been wrongfully appropriated
by the city there should be an award for damages under the
authority of St. Julian v. Morgan L. & T. Railroad.8 The ap-
plicability of the St. Julian doctrine in this context is ques-
tionable; moreover, since the paving of the sidewalk was done
in 1962 and since the suit was brought in 1968, the case may well
be covered by R.S. 48:491.19
Apart from "tacit dedication" under the terms of R.S. 48:491,
an interest in the public use of highways, roads, and streets
may be established by statutory dedication, by "formal" non-
statutory dedication, or by "implied" non-statutory dedication. 20
17. 237 So.2d 733 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
18. 35 La. Ann. 924 (1883).
19. In support of its decision, the court quoted language from Ford v.
City of Shreveport, 204 La. 618, 16 So.2d 127 (1943), a case involving an im-
plied dedication of a sidewalk. That language was obviously pertinent in
1943, under the old version of LA. R.S. 48:491 (1954). But after the 1954
amendment of LA. R.S. 48:491 (1954) to include the maintenance of an alley
or street by a municipality, the dictum in the Ford case may no longer be
relevant. It would seem that a decision on the merits in the case under con-
sideration ought to focus attention on the applicability and interpretation of
LA. R.S. 48:491 (1954).
20. Louisiana decisions lend support to the proposition that there arefour types of dedication. The dedication resulting from LA. R.S. 48:491
(1954) has been aptly termed "tacit dedication." Town of Eunice v. Childs,
205 So.2d 897 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968). The dedication resulting from LA. R.S.
33:5051 (1962) is commonly designated "statutory dedication." Chevron Oil
Co. v. Wilson, 226 So.2d 774 (La App. 2d Cir. 1969). A third species of dedica-
tion is a "formal" non-statutory dedication. Banta v. Federal Land Bank, 200
So.2d 107 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967). The fourth species of dedication is an
"Implied" non-statutory or "common law" dedication. City of Houma v.
Cunningham, 225 So.2d 613 (La. App. lst Cir. 1969).
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In City of Houma v. Cunningham21 the court found that a cer-
tain road had become public by virtue of an implied dedication,
since the owner had actually intended to dedicate the strip of
land in question and had manifested his intent by acts rather
than words. Interesting questions pertaining to statutory dedi-
cation were raised in Chevron Oil Co. v. Wilson,22 a concursus
proceeding for the distribution of royalties attributable to cer-
tain roadbeds. A country road established in early 19th century
on the west bank of Lake St. John was improved and partly
relocated in 1921; then it became part of the federal and state
highway systems. Lands adjoining the highway were subdivided
in 1926, and maps of the subdivisions were recorded at the clerk's
office. There was no express dedication of the road traversing
the subdivisions, but the plats marked the "improved highway."
The state contended that the recording of the survey showing
the "improved highway" constituted a statutory dedication un-
der R.S. 33:5051, vesting title of the roadbed in the public. Suc-
cessors in title of the original subdividers, however, claimed that
the dedication was merely tacit under R.S. 48:491; hence, they
had title to the roadbed subject to servitude in favor of the pub-
lic. The court held that prior to 1926 the road in question was
public under R.S. 48:491 and that the title of the roadbed vested
in the public in 1926 by virtue of substantial compliance with
Act 134 of 1896, now R.S. 33:5051. In the course of its opinion,
the court indicated that dedication under this statute is effected
without reference to any intention of the subdivider, the requisite
intention being generally presumed. The conclusion was bol-
stered by policy considerations concerning security of title and
acquisition.23 The result reached by the court is plausible.24 Yet,
21. 225 So.2d 613 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969). See aZso Hack v. Fontenot,
236 So.2d 877 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970). In this case, the court declared that
the servitude of the public use of a road, though discontinuous and thus
insusceptible of acquisition by prescription, may be acquired by implied
dedication.
22. 226 So.2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969); Comment, 30 LA. L. Riv. 583,
587 (1970).
23. Chevron Oil Co. v. Wilson, 226 So.2d 774, 777 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969):
"The rule of Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co. (supra) is now
a rule of property in this state. It lends itself to certainty in title examina-
tion. An examiner now knows that, if a map is recorded, the roads shown
on the subdivision plat are public and the ownership of the beds of the
roads is in a municipality, a parish or the state. To require an examiner to
determine whether a road shown on a recorded subdivision plat had been
the subject of an implied dedication prior to recording the plat would place
a considerable burden on an examiner."
24. See Comment, 30 LA. L. REV. 583, 603 (1970). The author points out
correctly that the Wilson case involved a "formal" though not statutory
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
it is regrettable that the Supreme Court of Louisiana passed this
opportunity to clarify much of the confusion surrounding the
types, incidents, and effects of dedication.
2 5
Parks and Cemeteries
In Akin v. Caddo Parish Police Jury26 taxpayers brought
suit to enjoin the police jury from expanding the parish court-
house located in a public square, on the ground that the pro-
posed improvements would impair the public use of the square
as a park and as a place of rest, recreation, and entertainment.
The court held that, in the absence of allegations showing that
plaintiffs had an interest different from that of the general pub-
lic, an exception of no right of action should have been main-
tained; but, since the suit affected "the orderly administration
of an important local government function,"2 7 the court also
considered the merits of the lawsuit and held that an injunction
would not lie. The square was public property, its title being
vested in the police jury and the police jury did not abuse its
discretion in undertaking the proposed improvements. The dis-
position on the merits is correct: dedication does not exclude
modifications of the public use in the general interest, and, in
this respect, public authorities enjoy a wide measure of discre-
tion. The alternate holding as to the exception of no right of
action may be justified under one line of decisions dealing with
taxpayers' suits; it is not relevant for suits tending to safeguard
the general interest in the use of public places. Indeed, accord-
ing to well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence, the state, its politi-
cal subdivisions, and any interested citizen may bring actions
for the preservation of public use.
28
In O'Quin v. Burks29 plaintiffs, owners of lots in a subdi-
vision, brought action for a judgment declaring that a certain
area in the subdivision had been dedicated to public use as a
park. A certain tract had indeed been designated in the recorded
plat of the subdivision as a "Proposed Park"; further, the same
plat contained language expressly dedicating streets and servi-
dedication. In both types of dedication the title of the roadbed vests in the
public. Cf. A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIvm LAw PROPERTY § 35 (1966).
25. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Wilson, 254 La. 849, 227 So.2d 593 (1969).
26. 234 So.2d 203 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
27. Id. at 208.
28. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 861; Parish of Jefferson v. Doody, 247 La. 839,
174 So.2d 798 (1965); State ex rel. Saint v. Timothy, 166 La. 738, 117 So. 812
(1928); Locke v. Lester, 78 So.2d 14 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955).
29. 231 So.2d 660 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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tudes for public utilities. The court held that the tract had not
been effectively dedicated as a park and that the subdividers
were under no obligation to comply with "proposed" uses of
their property. The reasoning seems to run as follows: (1) there
was no statutory dedication, because the subdividers did not
actually intend to dedicate the tract as a park-this lack of in-
tention became apparent from the fact that streets and servitudes
for public utilities were expressly dedicated; (2) there was no
implied dedication, because the subdividers did not manifest by
subsequent acts an intention to dedicate; moreover, since "a
dedication may be either statutory or implied but ... it cannot
be both,"30 the statutory dedication of streets and servitudes
precluded an implied dedication of the tract as a park. The
validity of this reasoning and the conclusion reached by the
court are questionable. Recent cases tend to protect the interests
of persons buying property in a subdivision by finding a statu-
tory dedication upon substantial compliance with the terms of
the statute and by dispensing with the requirement of intention
to dedicate.3' The designation of a tract as a "Proposed Park"
should suffice as an effective statutory dedication. Moreover, a
valid argument could be made that the requirements of a formal
non-statutory dedication had been met. There is no reason why
the statutory dedication of streets and servitudes should exclude
the possibility of this third dimension of dedication.82
In Vidrine v. Vidrine88 action was brought to declare public
the Te Mamou Cemetery and to enjoin the record owner of the
land from imposing charges for gravesites and from interfering
with the public use of the cemetery. Defendant conceded that
the cemetery was subject to public use, and thus the only issue
before the court was his right to charge for gravesites. It ap-
peared from the evidence that persons had been buried in the
cemetery since the middle 1800's and that charges had been at
times imposed by the record owners. The court held that the
property had been dedicated to public use by virtue of an in-
formal dedication; hence, title remained with the record owner
who had the right to charge for gravesites. The ruling that the
ownership of land had remained with the record owner is clearly
compatible with a long line of Louisiana decisions dealing with
30. Id. at 663.
31. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Wilson, 226 So.2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 254 La. 849, 227 So.2d 593 (1969).
32. See Comment, 30 LA. L. REv. 583 (1970).
33. 225 So.2d 691 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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the effects of informal dedication.8 4 It does not necessarily follow,
however, that the record owner has the right to charge for grave-
sites. The existence of this right should depend on the scope and
extent of dedication to public use, namely, whether the owners
of the land had or had not donated to the public the right to
bury dead without charge. The majority of the court was obvi-
ously satisfied with the evidence tending to show that the record
owners had not abandoned to the public that prerogative of
ownership, but had merely destined their land to be used as a
cemetery in perpetuity. In this light, the disposition of the case
is correct. In the course of its opinion, the court considered the
status of the cemetery as a public thing and the nature of the
interest of the general public in its continued use. "This dedica-
tion is in the nature of an irrevocable covenant running with
the land," the court declared. "It is a real right, not a servitude
or usufruct, but an implied contractual relationship that binds
the owner irrevocably."'85 This language obviously confuses "cove-
nants running with land," a typical common law institution,
with "real rights," a purely civilian classification of rights. More-
over, it assimilates "real rights," which are proprietary interests,
with "contractual relationships," which give rise to merely per-
sonal rights. Judge (now Justice) Tate's dissenting opinion is a
refreshing effort at reconciliation of the Louisiana jurisprudence
applicable to cemeteries with civilian principles. According to
him, cemeteries like the Te Mamou Cemetery are public things in
the sense that they are subject to public use; the interest of the
public is "a real right in the nature of a servitude."'86
Banks of Navigable Rivers
With respect to private things subject to public use, the
Civil Code expressly regulates only the public use of the banks
of navigable rivers. Article 455 declares that "the use of the
banks of navigable rivers or streams is public," although, ac-
cording to the same article, "the ownership of the river banks
belongs to those who possess the adjacent land." The content of
the public use is that "every one has the right freely to bring
his vessels to land there, to make fast the same to trees which
are there planted, to unload the vessels, to deposit his goods, to
dry his nets, and the like."87 According to well-settled Louisiana
34. See A. YANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 35 (1966).
35. 225 So.2d 691, 697 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
36. Id. at 699.
37. LA. Crv. CODE art. 455.
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jurisprudence, the servitude of public use under article 455 of
the Civil Code is not "for the use of the public at large for all
purposes." 8 The language of this article is indicative of possible
uses,89 but all uses must be incidental to the navigable char-
acter of the river and its enjoyment as an avenue of commerce.40
In the 1969-1970 term, Louisiana courts considered the scope
and extent of the public use of the banks of navigable rivers in
three interesting cases. In Tenneco, Inc. v. Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers Union4 the question arose as to whether picket-
ing on the levee of a navigable river in furtherance of a labor
dispute was a permissible public use. The majority of the court
held that article 455 of the Civil Code does not encompass
"picketing on the levee-a decidedly private use---and not one
incidental to navigation or commerce on the river."42 Judge
Redman dissented on the ground that picketing is a lawful
exercise of the servitude of public use. The majority opinion is
supported by a long line of Louisiana decisions placing a re-
strictive interpretation on article 455. In Warner v. Clarke43 suit
was brought to enjoin the sheriff of East Carroll Parish from
prosecuting plantiffs for trespassing on a posted levee and on
lands lying between the levee and a navigable river. Plaintiffs
claimed that they had, as members of the general public, the
right to fish and hunt on the banks of rivers under article 455,
although the banks may be privately owned and posted under
R.S. 14:63. The court correctly held that a declaratory judgment
on this issue would have been improper due to the absence of
indispensable parties, the landowners, and that an injunction
could not lie because plaintiffs did not possess a property right
threatened with invasion. Turning to the servitude of public use
under article 455, the court observed that legislation enacted
since the turn of the century made it clear that the general pub-
lic does not have the right to fish and hunt on levees and on
lands lying between levees and navigable rivers.4 4 Moreover,
38. Lyons v. Hinckley, 12 La. Ann. 655, 657 (1856).
39. See Pulley & Irwin v. Municipality No. 2, 18 La. 278, 285 (1841):
"The expression for the mooring of vessels, spreading nets, building cabins,
etc., used in the Code, whilst they are permissive for those purposes, are
not intended as restrictions of the use to those purposes alone, but as ex-
amples or illustrations of its applications."
40. See Hebert v. T. . James & Co., 224 La. 498, 70 So.2d 102 (1953);
State v. Richardson, 140 La. 829, 72 So. 984 (1916); Chinn v. Petty, 163 So.
735 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
41. 234 So.2d 246 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
42. Id. at 249.
43. 232 So.2d 99 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
44. Id. at 102.
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under the jurisprudence interpreting article 455, fishing and
hunting are not uses incidental to the navigable character of a
stream.45 In Parish of Jefferson v. Universal Fleeting Co." the
Parish of Jefferson brought an action to enjoin defendants, the
riparian landowner and his lessee, from using batture for com-
mercial purposes, namely, for the mooring of barges. Plaintiff
claimed that the use of the batture should be restricted to resi-
dential purposes in accordance with a directly applicable parish
zoning ordinance. Question thus arose as to the validity of the
zoning ordinance. The court correctly held that the zoning ordi-
nance violated articles 455 and 457 of the Civil Code in that it
attempted to do away with the servitude of public use and con-
stituted an unauthorized exercise of the zoning power. The
tying up of barges was the most logical use of the batture, the
court observed, "since it is in the interest of commerce and navi-
gation and is substantially similar to the uses contemplated and
specifically guaranteed to the public in Article 455 of the Civil
Code."47 The court pointed out that the riparian owner may use
the batture himself, provided he does not unreasonably obstruct
the public use of the banks. 48
MOVABLES AND IMMOVABLES
According to article 461 of the Louisiana Civil Code "the
third and last division of things is into movables and immov-
ables. ' '49 The significance of this division lies primarily in the fact
that different rules of property law apply to the different cate-
gories of things classified as movable or immovable, in connec-
tion with the scope, acquisition, protection, and transfer of
rights.5
In American Creosote Co. v. Springer5 1 question arose as to
whether the sale of a tract of land "with buildings and improve-
ments" also included railroad trackage belonging to a person
other than the vendor. The act of sale made no mention of the
45. See Delta Sec. Co. v. Dufresne, 181 La. 891, 160 So. 620 (1935); Delta
Duck Club v. Barios, 135 La. 357, 65 So. 489 (1914); Op. ATT'y GEN. 96
(1938-40); Op. ATT'Y GEN. 214 (1966-68).
46. 234 So.2d 88 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
47. Id. at 91.
48. Accord, Lake Providence Port Comm'n v. Bunge Corp., 193 So.2d 363
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1966); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1968-1969 Term-Property, 30 LA. L. REv. 181, 182 (1969).
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 461.
50. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 40 (1966).
51. 232 So.2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
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railroad trackage, but plaintiff, the vendor, claimed that the act
had been passed with the understanding between the parties that
the trackage was not included. Further, plaintiff claimed that
the trackage had been leased from, and belonged to, the Illinois
Central Railroad Company in accordance with the terms of a
written though unrecorded lease of which the purchaser was
aware, and that as a result of defendant's acts plaintiff had
become obligated to Illinois Central Railroad Company in the
amount of an indemnity bond securing execution of the terms of
the lease. Plaintiff demanded a money judgment in the amount
of his loss, that is, the amount of the indemnity bond. Defendant
filed an exception of no cause of action, claiming that the rail-
road trackage was immovable property the title to which had
passed to him along with the land as he had bought on the faith
of the public records. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed a judgment sustaining defendant's exception of no
cause of action. The railroad trackage, the court declared, was
an immovable by nature as a "construction" under article 464 of
the Civil Code. Therefore, in the absence of recorded claims
against it, the trackage passed along with the land to the pur-
chaser who had relied on the public records; moreover, parol
evidence would be inadmissible to contradict the terms of the
written act of sale. In determining that the railroad trackage
was an immovable by nature, the court followed Morgan's Loui-
siana & Texas Railroad & Steamship Co. v. Himalaya Planting
& Manufacturing Co. 52 The view of the court was that this case
has been only partly overruled by Caldwell v. Laurel Grove
Co.,58 namely, to the extent that a vendor's privilege is concerned,
and that the holding in the Morgan case that a railroad track is
an immovable by nature under article 464 is still controlling.
Another case, Louisiana Railway & Navigation Co. v. Cash Gro-
cery & Sales Co.,54 involving classification of railroad tracks was
distinguished. Judge Barnette dissented and filed a separate
opinion. In his view, the Caldwell case is authority for the prop-
osition that a railroad track may be movable property. The case
under review involves highly interesting questions pertaining to
the availability of oral testimony to clarify the terms of an
act of sale as between the parties to the transaction, application
of the public records doctrine in so far as the purchaser of land
is concerned, and to the purposes and effects of the classification
52. 143 La. 460, 78 So. 735 (1918).
53. 175 La. 928, 144 So. 718 (1932).
54. 150 So. 57 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933).
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of things as movable or immovable; but, since the supreme court
has granted certiorari, comments will be withheld until final
disposition.
In Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co.55 a tenant farmer sued
for damages to his crops caused by defendant's mineral opera-
tions. Plaintiff had raised crops under a verbal lease while
defendant had undertaken mineral exploration under a recorded
lease over the same property. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
on original hearing, affirmed a judgment dismissing the suit on
the ground that the farmer tenant could not assert his separate
ownership of the standing crops against the defendants. Fol-
lowing well-settled jurisprudence, the court declared that a
lease, to be effective against third persons, must be recorded in
accordance with R.S. 9:2721. In the absence of recordation, the
court reasoned, standing crops are regarded as movables in the
relationship between tenant and landlord and as immovables
under article 465 of the Civil Code insofar as third persons are
concerned. On rehearing, the court held that plaintiff could
recover under a theory of stipulation pour autrui, namely, on the
ground that the mineral lease between defendants and land-
owners contained a provision making defendants responsible
for the damage to the crops. The court pointed out that plaintiff
did not assert "secret claims or equities" unknown to defendants
and that defendants were not third persons protected by the
laws of registry insofar as plaintiff's claim was concerned.
Justices Hamiter, Sanders, and Barham dissented, adhering to
the views expressed in the original hearing. The final disposi-
tion of the case rested on the narrow ground that the separate
ownership of standing crops, arising under the terms of a lease,
whether recorded or unrecorded, might be asserted against a
third person tortfeasor who has made a stipulation in favor
of the lessee. It might be argued, however, that a tortfeasor
should also be responsible to a lessee under Civil Code article
2315, even in the absence of any stipulation. Be that as it may,
the final disposition of the case has nothing to do with the
classification of standing crops as movable or immovable prop-
erty. In this respect, the original opinion remains undisturbed
and stands for three significant propositions of property law:
(1) standing crops belonging to a lessee, whether under a
recorded or unrecorded lease, are movable property; (2) this
55. 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347 (1969).
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separate ownership of movable property may always be asserted
against the landlord-it may be asserted against third persons
(other than tortfeasors) only if the lease is recorded; and (3)
if the lease is unrecorded, third persons (other than tortfeasors)
are entitled to regard the crops as part of the immovable property
under article 465 of the Civil Code.
In Flowers v. Patton,56 an action on a promissory note issued
for the purchase of a chicken broiler house, defendant pleaded
failure of consideration. He argued that he did not acquire title
to the chicken house since it was not located on land belonging
to his vendor but on that of a third person, and as an immovable
by nature, the chicken broiler house belonged to the owner of
the land on which it was located. The court rightly held for
plaintiff, pointing out that the builder of a house on the land of
another may validly sell the house to third persons. Indeed,
from the viewpoint of the law of obligations, defendant had
bargained solely for a chicken broiler house and delivery of
possession had been made. The fact that defendant could be
disturbed in his possession in the future by the owner of the
land should not cause a failure of consideration. From the view-
point of property law, a house built by one on the land of
another may be regarded as a distinct immovable by nature for
certain purposes and as a part of the land for other purposes.1
However, according to well-settled jurisprudence, until such
time as the owner exercises his options under Civil Code article
508, the builder is regarded as owner and may dispose of the
house as he sees fit.5
PERSONAL SERVTuDEs; USUFRUCT
In Succession of Branch59 a recently emancipated minor
brought action against his mother and former natural tutrix
seeking a final accounting. Plaintiff's property consisted of a
share in his deceased father's separate property and of a share
in the community property subject to his mother's testamentary
usufruct. The trial court ordered the mother "to file an account-
ing as to the community property, and a final accounting as
to the separate property."' 0 Apparently, the order meant that
56. 230 So.2d 654 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
57. See A. YANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAw PRoP@RmTY § 46 (1966).
58. See Comment, 28 LA. L. Rgv. 584 (1968).
59. 230 So.2d 124 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
60. Id.
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the mother should identify the property subject to her usufruct
without undertaking actual distribution; but she should make,
as tutrix, a final accounting of the separate property in order
to terminate the tutorship. The court of appeal affirmed, adopt-
ing in part the reasoning of the trial court. The court seemed
to distinguish between the obligations of the mother as tutrix
and as usufructuary. Even if the usufructuary happens to be a
tutrix, there can be no final accounting of the property subject
to usufruct until termination of the enjoyment;0' but the tutrix
must certainly render a final accounting as to property that is
not subject to usufruct upon the emancipation of the minor.
In Heyse v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 2 question arose as to
the right of a father having the enjoyment of his child's property
to proceed in forma pauperis in an action for the recovery of
damages for personal injuries suffered by the child. In Lou-
isiana, "fathers and mothers . . . have, during marriage, the
enjoyment of the estate of their children until their majority
or emancipation." 63 This right of parental enjoyment is regarded
as a legal usufruct and is governed by the general rules of
usufruct as well as by a number of special provisions . 4 Thus,
whereas article 588 of the Civil Code deals with the question
of the apportionment of litigation costs as between usufructuaries
and naked owners in general, article 589 declares that "[f]athers
and mothers who enjoy the legal usufruct of the property of
their children, are bound to support the expenses of all suits
concerning that property, in the same manner as if they were
owners of it."65
Application of article 589 is subject to two conditions: the
minor must have property subject to parental enjoyment and the
litigation must be one "concerning that property." In the case
under consideration, although the father had means he claimed
that he was entitled to proceed in forma pauperis in an action
brought by him as administrator of his child's property because
the child did not have any property of his own. He relied on
Fontenot v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,8 which had
held that a father's action for personal injuries suffered by his
child is not an action "concerning that property" within the
61. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 92 (1968).
62. 255 La. 127, 229 So.2d 724 (1969).
63. LA. Civ. CODE art. 223.
64. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES §§ 52, 110 (1968).
65. LA. Crv. CoE art. 589.
66. 113 So.2d 33 (La. App. 1st Mr. 1959).
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meaning of article 589. The Supreme Court of Louisiana over-
ruled the Fontenot case and declared that a child's cause of
action for personal injuries constitutes "property"; moreover, an
action brought by a father having parental enjoyment for the
recovery of damages suffered by his child as a result of personal
injuries is an action "governing that property" within the mean-
ig of article 589. Since the father is bound to bear the cost of
litigation, he cannot proceed in forma pauperis under articles
5181 and 5182 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless, of course,
he is impecunious. The decision of the supreme court makes the
availability of the in forma pauperis proceeding depend upon the
financial condition of the father rather than the child. Since any
cause of action that a child may have constitutes property, the
child will never be found to be impecunious. This solution may
not be an orthodox interpretation of articles 5181 and 5182 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. If it were to be applied to all cases, the
benefit of an in forma pauperis proceeding would be denied to all
plaintiffs asserting valuable causes of action. But it is certainly a
fully acceptable interpretation of articles 5181 and 5182 in rela-
tion to articles 223 and 589 of the Civil Code. Thus the father
having the enjoyment of the property of his child under Civil
Code article 223 must support expenses of litigation in accordance
with Civil Code article 589, unless he is impecunious himself, in
which case he may claim the benefit of in forma pauperis pro-
ceeding under articles 5181 and 5182 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure.
In Succession of Bellinger71 the issue was whether an income
interest in trust given to a surviving spouse should be treated as
equivalent to a usufruct for Louisiana inheritance tax purposes.
The trust instrument had designated the settlor's descendants
as principal beneficiaries and had conferred authority on the
trustee to invade the principal for the maintenance and support
of the income beneficiary. The tax collector claimed that the
entire principal of the trust was taxable to the income benefi-
ciary; the surviving spouse claimed that the income interest
should be treated as a usufruct and taxed as such. The court
held that the part of the deceased's disposable portion which fell
within the trust was taxable to the income beneficiary because
of the invasion provisions of the trust instrument; but that as to
"the nondisposable portion or forced portion of the estate of the
decedent which is in trust, the tax rules and regulations as
67. 229 So.2d 749 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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applicable to usufruct would apply."8 The court reasoned that
"income interest" is synonymous with "usufruct" insofar as the
application of R.S. 47:2405 is concerned, although that statute
does not use the term income beneficiary or income interest.
They declared that an income interest in trust in favor of the
surviving spouse over the forced portion of an estate inherited
by children of the marriage is equivalent to a legal usufruct
under article 916 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the court con-
cluded the income interest of the surviving spouse was partially
exempt from inheritance tax liability. The assimilation of an
income interest in trust with usufruct may be correct for most
purposes, including certain matters of taxation. 9 One may ques-
tion, however, the assimilation of an income interest in trust in
favor of the surviving spouse, even if that interest is attributed
to the forced portion inherited by children of the marriage, with
the legal usufruct under article 916 of the Civil Code, which applies
to community property exclusively. It is true that the legal usu-
fruct of the surviving spouse may be confirmed by will, and that
confirmation, for inheritance tax purposes, does not convert the
legal usufruct into a testamentary ususfruct.7 o But it seems far-
fetched to say that the creation of an income interest in trust in
favor of the surviving spouse merely confirms the legal usufruct
under article 916. A will granting a usufruct over community
property inherited by issue of the marriage is quite different
from an instrument creating an income interest in trust.
In Barry v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.71 action
was brought for the recovery of damages for the destruction of
an automobile by plaintiff who was a surviving spouse in com-
munity. Plaintiff sued as owner of an undivided half and legal
usufructuary of the other half of the automobile. The district
judge rejected plaintiff's claim for damages to the automobile,
apparently on the ground that indispensable parties, namely, the
naked owners of an undivided one-half of the automobile, had
not been joined. In a well considered opinion grounded on the
applicable articles of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeal for the
Third Circuit held that the naked owners of an undivided share in
68. rd. at 751.
69. See Yiannopoulos, Testamentary Dispositions in Favor of the Sur-
viving Spouse and the Legitime of Descendants, 28 LA. L. Rav. 509, 512 n.
17 (1968).
70. see Succession of Baker, 129 La. 74, 55 So. 714 (1911); cf. Succession
of Brown, 94 So.2d 317 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Succession of Lynch, 145
So. 42 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
71. 236 So.2d 229 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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the automobile were not indispensable parties within the mean-
ing of article 646 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The conclusion
reached by the court is a welcomed functional application of leg-
islative texts, designed to achieve desirable practical results.
The appellate court founded its decision on the ground that
the usufruct of the surviving spouse does not terminate when an
individual thing subject to his or her legal enjoyment is totally
destroyed as a result of the fault of a third person; it attaches
instead to the claim for damages due by the wrongdoer. This
ground accords with both law and reason. According to a proper
interpretation of articles 613-15 of the Civil Code, made in the
light of historical sources, a usufruct terminates only as to indi-
vidual things totally destroyed by accident as a result of a for-
tuitous event (cas fortuit) 72 If the total loss of an individual
thing is attributed to the fault of the usufructuary or the naked
owner, the usufruct continues to exist and the consequences of
the loss are determined under the general rules of delictual obli-
gations or under the provisions governing the respective obliga-
tions of the usufructuary and the naked ower.78 If the total loss
is attributed to the fault of a third person, the principle of real
subrogation governs and the usufruct attaches to the claim
against the wrongdoer.7 4 Indeed, it would be both inequitable and
contrary to reason to deprive the usufructuary of his enjoyment
in case the property is destroyed as a result of the fault of a
third person; it suffices that the usufructuary bears the risk of a
purely accidental loss. Modern civil codes go even further and
declare that, in all cases of loss or destruction of the property,
the usufruct attaches to the claim for payment, compensation, or
indemnity due by reason of insurance or damages for the
destruction of the thing.75
Civil Code articles 613-15 contemplate the destruction of
individual things and are clearly applicable to a usufruct created
by particular title. The applicability of these articles to a uni-
versal usufruct or to a usufruct by universal title is at best ques-
tionable. It should be apparent that a usufruct bearing on a mass
72. See PLANIOL ET RPERT, TRArtI DO DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 841 (2d ed. Picard
1952).
73. See 2 AuBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 694 (7th ed. Esmein 1961);
5 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITt TH20RIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVWL 485 (2d ed.
Chauveau 1899).
74. See note 73 supra; A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 87 (1968).
75. See, e.g., GREEK CIV. CODE art. 1171; but cf. BGB § 1065 (Kohihammer
1949).
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of things does not terminate because a single thing has been
destroyed. Question may arise, however, whether the usufruct
terminates insofar as the thing that has been destroyed is con-
cerned. In the case under consideration, the court reached the
conclusion that "it would not be good policy to allow partial
termination" 76 of the survivor's usufruct. This conclusion is fully
justified. There is no reason why a universal usufructuary or a
usufructuary under universal title should be subjected to a series
of suits for accounting as things subject to the usufruct are
lost or destroyed. One accounting at the end of the usufruct is
what the law provides and what is needed, unless of course things
are destroyed by the fault of the usufructuary and the interests
of the naked owner are imperiled. If the usufructuary by uni-
versal title happens to be the survivor in community, additional
reasons exist why the usufruct should not terminate even as to
individual things lost or destroyed. According to well settled
Louisiana jurisprudence, the survivor's usufruct does not termi-
nate "merely because the property to which the usufruct attached
was changed in form" ;77 termination of the usufruct would be
inconsistent with the policy underlying article 916 of the Civil
Code.
Once it is determined that the usufruct of the surviving
spouse does not terminate where individual things are destroyed
by the fault of a third person, it ought to follow that the naked
owners are not indispensable parties under article 646 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in an action brought by the usufructuary
against the wrongdoer. Since the perfect usufruct is now imper-
fect, the usufructuary is owner of the claim for damages; the
former naked owner is merely a creditor of the usufructuary for
the amount of the claim."" As creditor, the former naked owner
may be a necessary party in certain circumstances though not an
indispensable party. Of course, if the usufructuary commits any
fault in the collection of the claim, the former naked owner may
collect damages from him at the end of the usufruct.79
It is true that in Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. De-
rouen80 the Supreme Court of Louisiana indicated that a naked
76. Barry v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 So.2d 229, 233 (La.
App. 3d. Cir. 1970).
77. State, Dep't of Highways v. Costello, 158 So.2d 850, 852 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963). See also Succession of Dielmann, 119 La. 101, 43 So. 972 (1907).
78. See LA. Crv. CODE arts. 536, 549.
79. Id. art. 567 (2).
80. 239 La. 467, 118 So.2d 889 (1960).
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owner is an indispensable party in an expropriation proceeding.
Leaving aside the question whether a single decision may be a
binding precedent in Louisiana, the Derouen case is distinguish-
able from the Barry case. In the first place, it can be argued that
expropriation is quite different from the destruction of property
by the fault of a third person, and that a usufruct other than
that of the surviving spouse does terminate.81 Secondly, in cases
of expropriation of immovable property, the naked owner may
be an indispensable party because expropriation is a forced sale
and the usufructuary is without authority to dispose of the prop-
erty.82 In cases involving destruction of things by the fault of a
third person, the naked owner is not an indispensable party
because the usufructuary does not dispose of any property; he
merely collects his own claim.
PREDIAL SERVITUDES
In Rockhold v. Keatyl8 plaintiffs sought a right of passage
over defendant's property under article 699 of the Civil Code.
Plaintiffs originally owned a tract of land which had access to a
public highway; however, following expropriation of part for
the construction of a controlled-access highway, plaintiffs' re-
maining property was landlocked. The controlled-access highway
was the public road nearest to plaintiffs' property, but there
could be no access to it under either federal or state law. Hence,
plaintiffs asked for a right of passage over a neighbor's property,
which would give access to other property of plaintiffs that was
still connected with a public road. The lower court, relying on
the authority of English Realty Co. v. Meyer,8 4 held that prop-
erty is not "enclosed" within the meaning of article 699 when
it borders a highway, even though the highway is access-
controlled and allows neither ingress nor egress. Accordingly, it
sustained an exception of no cause of action and granted a motion
for summary judgment. On certiorari, the supreme court af-
firmed though for different reasons. In a well reasoned opinion,
Justice Barham undertook to give a functional interpretation to
Civil Code article 699 in the light of contemporary exigencies,
and concluded that plaintiffs' land had become enclosed within
the contemplation of the article; the English Realty case was
81. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 87, text at n. 45 (1968).
82. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 535.
83. 237 So.2d 663 (La. 1970).
84. 228 La. 423, 82 So.2d 698 (1955).
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confined to its own facts. Since, however, the passage sought by
plaintiffs was not to a public road but to other land of the plain-
tiffs, and since there were shorter, more direct, and more feasi-
ble routes of passage to public roads, plaintiffs were not entitled
to the relief granted by the Civil Code.
In Nicholson v. Holloway Planting Co.85 plaintiff landowner
brought action against the owner of adjacent land for the
enforcement of a natural servitude of drain under article 660 of
the Civil Code. Plaintiff claimed that his estate was situated
above defendant's and that he was entitled to empty waters into
the estate situated below both through natural channels and by
means of certain artificial works. He sought to enjoin defendant
from obstructing the natural flow of the waters and to compel
him to remove all obstacles blocking this flow. Defendant
claimed that the two estates had the same elevation, thus deny-
ing the existence of a servitude of drain; in the alternative, defen-
dant argued that plaintiff was not entitled to increase the volume
or velocity of the flow by artificial works and asked for an
injunction prohibiting plaintiff from constructing and maintain-
ing such artificial works.
The lower court found, on the basis of conflicting evidence,
that plaintiff's estate was situated above, but held that plaintiff
did not have the right to make the natural servitude more bur-
densome for the servient estate by man-made works. It conceded
that plaintiff had the right to improve his plantation for agricul-
tural purposes and could construct artificial means of drainage,
but any excess flow resulting therefrom could not be emptied
onto defendant's land. The court was rightly impressed with
defendant's argument that article 660 of the Civil Code should be
given a functional or objective interpretation in the light of mod-
ern engineering discoveries and present day scientific knowledge
of draining farm lands by comprehensive artificial systems. Had
plaintiff undertaken the construction of a modern irrigation sys-
tem, he would be able to empty waters into a public waterway.
Such an approach would not ignore rules of enacted law. It
would permit a logical application of the rules of the Civil Code
in the light of contemporary technological development, and it
would realize the original intent of the law, which is to encour-
age the productive use of lands. The court, however, did not find
it necessary to indulge in such an interpretation of article 660,
85. 255 La. 1, 229 So.2d 679 (1969).
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since it was able to find that plaintiff was not entitled to the
relief sought under the plain language of the law. Defendant's
alternative demand for an injunction against plaintiff was not
considered for procedural reasons.
Defendant applied to the supreme court for certiorari, assign-
ing as errors the recognition by the lower court of the servitude
of drain and the refusal to consider the demand for an injunc-
tion against plaintiff. A divided supreme court affirmed the judg-
ment of the lower court on the grounds that there was sufficient
evidence to establish the existence of a natural servitude of
drain and that defendant was not entitled to an injunction under
the substantive law. According to the majority opinion, plaintiff
had the right to accelerate the flow of waters by artificial means,
though not the volume of the waters emptying into defendant's
land. But, since the record contained neither evidence that plain-
tiff had abused his privilege nor evidence that the artificial works
of plaintiff had diverted any additional water, injunction could
not lie. Justice Sanders dissented on the ground that plaintiff
had not carried the burden of proof of the existence of a natural
servitude of drain.
In Reymond v. State, Department of Highways0 a landowner
brought action against the state and its contractor for the recov-
ery of damages resulting from highway construction. Plaintiff
claimed "severance or consequential damages"; namely, an
indemnity for deprivation of easy and direct access to the prop-
erty, for impairment of view, and for the inconvenience and noise
resulting from heavy traffic in the vicinity. In addition, plaintiff
claimed an indemnity for structural damages to her home result-
ing from pile-driving operations. On certiorari, a divided
supreme court held that the department of highways is no longer
immune from suit and liability; that "[d]amages which cause dis-
comfort, disturbance, inconvenience, and even sometimes finan-
cial loss as an ordinary and general consequence of public
improvements are not compensable, and are considered damnum
absque injuria,"87 and that recovery for structural damage may
be claimed under article 1, section 2, of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion though not under article 667 of the Civil Code. In the course
86. 255 La. 425, 231 So.2d 375 (1970).
87. Id. at 449, 231 So.2d at 384. Justices Hamlin, Summers, and Sanders
dissented from this holding and filed separate opinions.
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of its opinion, the court undertook to clarify, by way of dictum, 88
the scope of articles 667-69 in the field of civil responsibility.
Discussion of the proper interpretation of article 1, section 2,
of the Louisiana Constitution is omitted, because this is an expro-
priation matter discussed elsewhere in this symposium. The
question whether recovery for structural damage should be based
on article 1, section 2, of the Constitution or on article 667 of the
Civil Code may be disposed of briefly. One may argue that arti-
cle 667 should not determine the liability of public bodies or their
contractors undertaking the execution of public works.8 9 This
liability may be adequately covered by rules of public law which
render unnecessary resort to the Civil Code. The question of
the scope of application of articles 667-69, however, requires
comment, because it concerns fundamental principles of Louisi-
ana civil law.
According to the majority opinion, grounded on a literal
interpretation of the text of Domat, 0 article 667 "prohibits a
proprietor of an estate from constructing and keeping buildings,
edifices, structures, levees, and other such works upon his estate
which do damage to a neighbor or deprive the neighbor of the
facility of enjoying his own estate. This article is applicable only
to structural changes in or on the land, and it is the existence of
the thing, the construction, or the change upon the estate which
must give rise to the damage."9 1 Thus, article 667 "is inappli-
cable to the activities of man .... The redress which the article
affords, if any, exists only in favor of a proprietor and then only
88. Cf. dissent by Justice Hamlin, Id. at 463, 231 So.2d at 389: "I do not
believe that the discussion of Article 667 of the Revised Civil Code in the
majority opinion was necessary to a decision in the instant matter"; and
dissent by Justice Sanders, Id. at 466, 231 So.2d at 390: "Although reliance
upon Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code is unnecessary for recovery
in the present case, I must note that the language of the majority opinion
unsettles the prior jurisprudence construing this Article."
89. It ought to be noted that certain Louisiana courts have been reluc-
tant to apply article 667 of the Civil Code against the state. See, e.g., Klein
v. Department of Highways, 175 So.2d 454 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 248 La. 369, 178 So.2d 658 (1965) (streets and highways are not the
subject of ownership contemplated by article 667 to bring a plaintiff within
the right of action for damages to property against the state). See also
Plcou v. Department of Highways, 224 So.2d 102 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969);
Bazanac v. State, Dep't of Highways, 218 So.2d 121 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969)
(exception of no right of action sustained; Department of Highways im-
mune from liability). On certiorari, the two cases were consolidated and
reversed. Bazanac v. Department of Highways, 255 La. 418, 231 So.2d 373
(1970).
90. See 1 OEuvREs DE J. DOMAT 333 (ed. Remy 1835).
91. Reymond v. State, Dep't of Highways, 255 La. 425, 442, 231 So.2d 375,
381 (1970).
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against the proprietor of a nearby estate for construction or
plantings upon that estate which by their very existence deprive
the former of the use and enjoyment of his property or which
cause him damage. '92 The court noted that Louisiana courts have
"fallaciously interpreted and applied Article 667 for many
years"98 but did not overrule the jurisprudence "which has
allowed recovery for damages resulting from the use of danger-
ous instrumentalities and materials or man's engagement in
inherently hazardous activities. '94 It simply found article 667
inapplicable in such situations, and declared that there is no
need to "state the basis, authority, or source for recovery in cases
of this nature."95 Further, since article 667 has often been treated
in parity with articles 668 and 669, the court concluded that
article 669 "does not establish a predial servitude under the Lou-
isiana civilian concept."96
The literal interpretation of the text of Domat, expounded
by the majority opinion, is undoubtedly correct. The examples
furnished by Domat refer, indeed, to "constructions" rather than
"acts." Question arises, however, whether the text of Domat
ought to control in the interpretation of the word "work" in arti-
cle 667. It is true, of course, that article 667 reproduces verbatim
a passage from the treatise of Domat. According to the newly
published notes of Moreau-Lislet, however, article 15, page 130,
of the Digest of 1808, corresponding with article 667 of the 1870
92. Id. at 444-45, 231 So.2d at 382.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 445, 231 So.2d at 383.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 443, 231 So.2d at 382 n. 6. According to the majority opinion, the
reasons why article 669 does not establish a servitude are these: "First, by
providing redress for those in the same house it would require a servitude
on an estate in favor of the same estate. Second, by providing redress for
those in neighboring houses it appears to give a cause of action for enforc-
ing its provisions to persons other than the proprietor of an estate. Such
results are contrary to our theory that predial servitudes run with land and
in favor of the proprietor of the estate." Id. It is submitted that neither rea-
son is well taken. Under the Louisiana Civil Code, as well as under special
legislation, an apartment in a house may be a separate immovable. See LA.
CxV. CODM art. 506; LA. R.S. 9:1121-42 (1950). Thus, article 669 does not neces-
sarily presuppose a servitude on an estate in favor of the same estate, which,
of course, is not legally possible. Moreover, there is no validity to the as-
sertion that the express language of this article should be disregarded simply
because it is contrary to the "theory" that predial servitudes run with the
land in favor of the proprietor of the estate. According to the civilian tra-
dition, the so-called natural servitudes must be regarded as limitations on
the content of ownership rather than as servitudes in the strict sense of
the word. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT ClVIL FRAN A1S 280-323 (7th ed. Esmein
1961); 2 MARTY ET RsYNAUD, DROIT civIL 162-65 (1965); Yiannopoulos, Predial
Servitudes; General Prlnciples: Louisana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L.
Rav. 1, 44 (1968).
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Code, refers to part 3, tit. 32, law 13; Fuero Real, book 3, tit. 4,
law 3; Domat, vol. 1, part 1, book 1, tit. 12, sec. 2, law 8; Febrero,
cont. vol. 2, ch. 4, s. 9 no. 166-169.27 Thus, the text of Domat
appears to be only one of the references and third in order of
sequence. First in order of sequence is the reference to the Siete
Partidas, which until 1825,98 and possibly until 1828,09 were
directly applicable in Louisiana. In the light of this newly found
evidence it is submitted that the redactors of the Digest of 1808
apparently intended to utilize the text of Domat in order to
express an idea common to all the sources they had inspected.
Partida 3, tit. 32, law 13, indicated in the Moreau-Lislet notes as
the primary source of article 667, declares the principle which
all other sources, including Domat, reiterate: "For as was said
by the ancient sages, although a man has the power to do what
he pleases, upon his own ground, yet he ought to do in such a
manner, as to cause no damage, or harm, to any other person."'1
This is a fundamental principle of the civil law, formulated
first by UlpianW°1 and expounded by civilian writers through
the centuries. Quite independently from Domat and from the
other authors cited in the Moreau-Lislet notes, Pothier de-
clared: "Vicinage obliges the neighbors to use their estate in
such a manner as to cause no damage to their neighbors. This
rule must be understood in the sense that, although one is at
liberty to do with his estate whatever he pleases, still one can
do nothing which may cause injury to his neighbor. 102 In the
light of this unbroken civilian tradition, a literal interpretation
of the word "work" in article 667 to mean exclusively "con-
struction" is too narrow. This article, as Justice Sanders pointed
97. See REPRINT OF MOREAU-LISLET'S COPY OF A DIGEST OF THE CIviL LAws
Now IN FORCE IN THE) TERRITORY OF ORLEANS art. 15 at 130 (1808), known as
the de la Vergne Volume.
98. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 3521 (1825); Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 93
(La. 1817); Hayes v. Berwick, 2 Mart. (O.S.) 138 (La. 1812).
99. See La. Acts 1828, No. 83, § 25, known as the Great Repealing Act of
1828; Flowers v. Griffith, 6 Mart. (N.S.) 89 (La. 1827); cf. Reynolds v. Swain,
13 La. 193, 198 (1839).
100. 1 MOREAu-LISLET AND CARLETON, THE LAWS OF THE SIETE PARTIDAS 440
(1820). It is significant that the translators cited in this connection "C. art.
15, p. 130." Id.
101. See ILPIAN, DIGEST bk. 1, tit. 1, 1. 10: Iuris praecepta sunt haec:
honeste vivere, alterum non-laedere, auum quique tribuere (The precepts
of the law are these: to live honorably, to harm no one, and to attribute to
each his own.)
102. See POTHmR, DR LA socifth No. 235, 4 OEUVES DR POTHIER 30 (6d.
Bugnet 1861).
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out in his dissenting opinion, was apparently intended to recog-
nize the sic utere doctrine. 1 3
While the literal interpretation of article 667 in the light of
its historical sources might leave room for the view that the
word "work" means merely "constructions," a teleological in-
terpretation of the same article leads to the conclusion that the
word "work" ought to include "acts." In other words, as a
matter of policy, it is preferable to apply article 667 to all sit-
uations in which constructions or activities cause unwarranted
harm to property. The contrary view would not only unsettle
Louisiana jurisprudence and would write out of the Code the
sic utere doctrine,104 but it would eliminate a most important
legislative basis for civil responsibility and result in unneces-
sary importation of a common law tort doctrine.
For almost two centuries, Louisiana courts, following an
uninterrupted civilian tradition, have understood article 667 to
establish the sic utere doctrine and to cover constructions as
well as activities on an estate that cause unwarranted harm to
another estate. It is true, of course, that courts have not always
been consistent in the application of article 667, and that this
article has been said to establish liability for negligence, liability
without fault, and even quasi-contractual liability. In this re-
spect, there is room for clarification and for a much needed im-
provement of the law, but it is an unacceptable solution to sup-
press the article and to sweep the old cases "under the rug."'10 5
In the Louisiana Civil Code, the sic utere doctrine does not
presuppose a servitude in the ordinary sense, and, therefore, the
obligation not to cause harm to property need not be regarded
as a charge laid on an estate in favor of another estate. The
concept of sic utere is, indeed, much broader than that of an
obligation arising from a servitude. The doctrine may have been
formally established in the framework of legal servitudes as an
obligation arising by operation of law, but it is not necessary
that its applications be limited to relations between estates. It
is just an historical accident that obligations arising from vicinage
103. See Reymond v. State, Dep't of Highways, 255 La. 425, 466, 231 So.2d
375, 390 (1970): "The majority advances the opinion that Article 667 applies
only to buildings, edifices, structures, levees and other structural changes in
and on the land that produce damage to the neighbor. It restricts the
Article to only one category of estate use, undermining the assumption that
the Article serves as a statutory base for the sic utere doctrine."
104. See dissenting opinion by Justice Sanders, Id. at 466, 231 So.2d at 391.
105. Id,
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have been classified in the Louisiana and French Civil Codes
as servitudes arising by the operation of law. According to accu-
rate analysis, adopted in modern civil codes,106 the obligations
of vicinage are treated as limitations on the right of owner-
ship. 10 7 But whether regarded as limitations on the right of
ownership or as legal servitudes, the obligations arising from
vicinage are specific applications of the sic utere doctrine. Writ-
ing the sic utere doctrine out of the Louisiana Civil Code would
thus affect not only the law of predial servitudes but also broad
fields of the civil law.
From another viewpoint, it is important for courts in a state
of codified laws to have a legislative basis in order to achieve
flexibility in the administration of justice.10 8 Article 667 of the
Civil Code has served this function well and it may continue to
do so. The diversity of opinion as to its meaning and ramifica-
tions, as to the kind and measure of the liability that it imposes,
is in this respect welcome because it allows a variety of ap-
proaches for the resolution of important social conflicts. This
article may well be expanded to form the basis of a doctrine of
"risk" liability or even the basis of a Louisiana doctrine of abuse
of rights.'0 It should not be condemned to obscurity by a narrow
interpretation. It is hoped that, should the occasion arise, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana will reconsider the matter of the
proper interpretation of article 667 and will remove the uncer-
tainty presently surrounding it.llO
In effect, the majority opinion of the supreme court has
sought to excessively restrict the area of application of article
667 of the Civil Code, leaving room for the expansion of com-
mon law tort doctrine. The wisdom of this approach may be
106. See BGB §§ 906, 907, 908 (Kohlhammer 1949); GREIK CIV. CODE arts.
1003, 1004, 1005.
107. See 2 AUBRY ET RAU, DRorr CIVIL FRANgAIS 280-323 (7th ed. Esmein
1961); 2 MARTY ET REYNAUD, DRorT CIVIL 162-65 (1965).
108. Cf. dissenting opinion by Justice Sanders, Reymond v. State, Dep't
of Highways, 255 La. 425, 466, 231 So.2d 375, 390 (1970). In the majority opinion,
the court declared that "we need not and do not state the basis, authority,
or source for recovery In cases of this nature." Id. at 446, 231 So.2d at 383.
This is a surprising assertion, because Louisiana is a state of codified laws.
109. In France, even in the absence of a legislative foundation, courts
have developed a doctrine of abuse of rights. Bee 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITA
PRATIQUE DR DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 452 (2d ed. Picard 1952). In modern civil codes,
the doctrine of abuse of rights has been codified. See, e.g., GREEK CIV. CODE
art. 281: "The exercise of a right is prohibited if It obviously exceeds the
limits imposed by good faith, good mores, or those imposed by the social
or economic purpose of the right."
110. This occasion may well be the case of Chaney v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
238 So.2d 847 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 239 So.2d 358 (La. 1970).
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questioned. Of course, common law may be perfectly competent
to give remedies in most matters of tort law, but so is the civil
law. Apart from the relevance of article 667 in the field of civil
responsibility in general, one ought to consider its relevance in
cases regarded as matters of "nuisance" in common law juris-
dictions. If the intention of the majority opinion of the supreme
court were to facilitate adoption of the common law of nuisance,
additional questions arise as to the advisability of the court's
action. The law of nuisance is perhaps the least developed branch
of the common law of torts."' Wholesale adoption of the com-






In Succession of Willis v. Martin' some two weeks after the
death of Olan Willis, his daughter Audry, as his sole surviving
heir, sold two lots formerly belonging to the deceased. This suit
was instituted by the vendees to traverse the descriptive list filed
by the administratrix in the succession of Olan, and to remove
therefrom the two lots which were listed by the administratrix
as forming part of the estate of the deceased. Although the court
admitted that the property of the deceased was transmitted to
the heir by operation of law, and that the heir could validly
convey his interest therein, the vendee, the court stated, held
111. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 87 at 592 (3d ed. 1964): "There is perhaps
no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds
the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all men, and has been ap-
plied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a
cockroach baked in a pie. There is general agreement that it is incapable of
any exact or comprehensive definition. Few terms have afforded so excellent
an illustration of the familiar tendency of the courts to seize upon a catch-
word as a substitute for any analysis of a problem; ... there has been a
rather astonishing lack of any full consideration of 'nuisance' on the part
of legal writers. It was not until the publication of the Restatement of
Torts in 1939 that there was any really significant attempt to determine
some definite limits to types of tort liability which are associated with the
name."
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 228 So.2d 732 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 225 La. 244, 230
So.2d 93 (1970).
